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Abstract—We consider multiple source nodes (consumers)
communicating wirelessly their energy demands to the meter
data-management system (MDMS) over the subarea gateway(s).
We quantify the impacts of passive and active security attacks on
the wireless communications system’s reliability and security as
well as the energy-demand estimation-error cost in dollars paid
by the utility. We adopt a multiple-input multiple-output multi-
antenna-eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channel model. To
secure the MIMO wireless communication system, the legitimate
nodes generate artificial noise (AN) vectors to mitigate the effect
of the passive eavesdropping attacks. In addition, we propose
a redundant design where multiple gateways are assumed to
coexist in each subarea to forward the consumers’ energy-
demand messages. We quantify the redundant designs impact
on the communication reliability between the consumers and the
MDMS and on the energy-demand estimation-error cost.
Index Terms—MIMO, active and passive attacks, reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid (SG) revolutionizes the aging energy grid
by enabling a more efficient and adaptive electric utility.
In this context, two-way wireless communications is critical
in connecting the different SG network nodes and ensuring
efficient SG operation. Reliability and security are funda-
mental SG quality-of-service (QoS) requirements that impact
both response time and information confidentiality for the
communicating nodes.
Demand-side management (DSM) refers to a set of methods
used by the utilities to manage the energy consumption effi-
ciently using the existing SG infrastructure. The SG’s wireless
communications system must overcome the challenges of
components failures and security attacks to maximize the
utility’s efficiency and reduce its response times.
A. Related work
Reliability of the SG’s communications system impacts
how the energy generation and distribution will meet the
consumers’ energy requirements. The service area is generally
divided into subareas each with multiple consumers. Each
consumer is equipped with a smart meter to monitor the
energy-consumption of electric devices. The reliability of
the SG’s wireless communications systems was investigated
in several works, e.g., [1], [2] and the references therein.
The authors of [1] analyzed the reliability of SG wireless
communications systems that support DSM, where the utility
implements an advanced metering infrastructure.
Recently, there has been increased research focus on SG
security analysis, see, e.g., [3], [4] and the references therein.
In [3], the authors provided an overview of SG security issues.
SG security attacks can be classified into two categories:
active attacks that attempt to disrupt the normal function-
ality of a network such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
and passive attacks such as eavesdropping attacks [5] where
the attackers attempt to decode and analyze the information
exchanges to obtain important information about the legitimate
transmitter-receiver nodes. Communication system secrecy
from an information-theoretic perspective, also referred to as
physical layer (PHY) security, was studied in the pioneering
work of Wyner [6]. The system’s PHY security is measured
by the secrecy capacity of the link connecting the legitimate
nodes, which represents the maximum rate of the legitimate
transmitter-receiver pair with zero information leakage to the
eavesdropping node.
Outage probability of the multiple-input multiple-output
multi-antenna-eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channels was
analyzed in several works including [7], [8]. Reference [7]
analytically optimized the secrecy rate of the MIMOME
wiretap channel assuming statistical channel state information
at the transmitter (CSIT). In [8], the system’s secrecy was
defined as a lower-bound on the minimum mean squared
error between the transmitted and decoded data at the eaves-
dropping node. In [9], the authors investigated the impact
of the wireless network’s security and reliability on DSM
operation in the SG for the single-input single-output (SISO)
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) wiretap
channel. Assuming both active and passive attacks, the authors
proposed a framework that connects the DSM and the outage
probabilities of the wireless links. An artificial noise (AN)
injection scheme was also proposed to enhance the security.
In [10], the authors investigated the secrecy rate of MIMO
wiretap channels and guaranteed a predefined signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) for successful decoding at the legitimate receiver.
B. Contributions
Our main contributions are summarized as follows
• Unlike [9], we investigate the impact of the passive
and active security attacks on the DSM operation for
MIMO SG communications. We design the active attacks
where the attacker sends a jamming signal to hurt the
legitimate receivers without hurting the passive attacker
(eavesdropper). In addition, we propose a new scheme
to secure the legitimate system and derive the optimal
transmit and receive filters that maximize the rates of the
legitimate links.
• We analyze the achievable link rates under the proposed
scheme and derive the necessary conditions on the num-
ber of antennas at each node to inject the AN signals.
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• To further enhance the communications reliability, we
propose a redundant design in which more than one
gateway (Bob) is located in each subarea. In addition, we
investigate the effect of this new design on both the PHY
security and the utility’s monetary loss due to energy-
demand estimation errors.
Notation: Lower- and upper-case bold letters denote vectors
and matrices, respectively. IN stands for the identity matrix
with size N × N . CM×N is the set of complex matrices of
size M ×N . A∗ indicates the Hermitian transpose of matrix
A. E{·} stands for statistical expectation. 0M×N refers to the
all zero matrix with size M ×N , [·]+ = max{0, ·} returns the
maximum between the argument and zero, and
(
n
K
)
denotes
the n choose K operation.
II. MAIN ASSUMPTIONS
Consider a wireless network composed of a set of N
consumers (Alices) communicating with their gateways (Bobs)
which forward their energy-demand messages to a data ag-
gregation unit (George) as shown in Fig. 1. We investigate
the scenario where each subarea q is assigned to m ≥ 1
gateways Bq1 , · · · , Bqm. We assume dual-hop transmissions
where each consumer transmits his data to Bob who decodes-
then-forwards the data to George. We consider both passive
and active security attacks on the legitimate communication
system generated by an eavesdropper (Eve) and a jammer
(Jimmy), respectively, over the two communication hops. The
number of antennas at Alice, Bob, Eve, George and Jimmy
are denoted by NA, NB , NE , NG and NJ , respectively. The
number of data streams transmitted from node ν to node r
is Nν,r. Eve’s instantaneous CSI is assumed to be unknown
at the legitimate transmitters. As it will be explained shortly,
passive attacks degrade the communication system’s reliability
since the legitimate transmitters will assign portions of their
transmit powers to inject AN signals to secure their transmis-
sions. Moreover, active attacks degrade reliability since Jimmy
sends jamming signals to degrade the received signals at the
legitimate receivers.
Since the network topology is well established and any
change in the number of nodes in the network is rare, there is
no congestion in the network [1], [9]. A time-division multiple-
access (TDMA) scheme is assumed for all legitimate transmis-
sions. Hence, each communication time slot is divided into N
non-overlapping time subslots (each with duration equal to
the channel coherence time) and each consumer is assigned
to one of these subslots. Each transmitting node encodes the
data over k communication subslots during each hour.
We assume a quasi-static flat-fading channel model with
fixed channel coefficients during the coherence time. We de-
note the channel coefficient between the k-th antenna at node
ν and the l-th antenna at node r by hνk,rl . The fading channel
coefficients are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. We denote the n-th Alice,
the i-th Bob in subarea q, George, Eve, and Jimmy by n,
Bqi , G, E, and J , respectively. Hν,r refers to the channel
matrix between node ν and node r. The thermal noise at the
receiving node r is modeled as a zero-mean additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) random process with a variance of
κr Watts/Hz. We assume fixed-power transmissions with a
transmit power spectral density of Pν Watts/Hz for transmit
node ν.
A. Energy-Demand Estimation-Error Cost
The DSM system operation is realized over two stages [1],
[9]: the unit-commitment and the economic-dispatch stages.
During the first stage, the utility reserves the energy supply
based on the estimated energy demand of the consumers
during a period of one hour. If the energy supply was under
estimated, the utility will buy the energy difference in the
economic-dispatch stage to prevent the under-supply situation.
The energy demand-estimation cost of the n-th consumer
whose energy data was not correctly decoded at MDMS is
given by [9]
C(n)=puc
µn∫
0
(µn−a) f (a)A (n) da+ped
Emax∫
µn
(a−µn) f (a)A (n) da (1)
where f (a)A is the probability density function of the actual en-
ergy consumption, µn is the mean energy demand of consumer
n, Emax is the maximum energy consumption, and ped and puc
are the energy prices in the economic-dispatch and the unit-
commitment stages, respectively. The average energy-demand
estimation-error cost is
E{C(n)} =
N∑
n=1
C(n)Pnoutage (2)
where Pnoutage is the outage probability while transmitting the
n-th Alice packet.
B. Active Security Attacks
To jam the legitimate communications system, Jimmy
injects a jamming (AN) signal to degrade the legitimate
receivers’ SNRs. The jamming signal precoding matrix is
designed in a way that hurts the legitimate receivers only
without degrading the eavesdropper’s SNR.
III. PROPOSED SECURE SCHEME AND ACHIEVABLE RATES
To secure the legitimate transmissions, each legitimate
transmitter injects an AN signal along with its data signal.
Each legitimate transmitting node (i.e., Alice or Bob) splits its
transmit power between data and AN transmissions. A fraction
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 of the total power Pν of transmitting node ν is
assigned to data transmission while the remaining fraction of
(1− θ)Pν is assigned to AN transmission.
A. First Hop
Assuming that the information signal and AN signal pre-
coding matrices at node ν ∈ {n,Bqi } are given by Pν and
Qν , respectively, the received signal vector at Bob is
yBqi
= Hn,Bqi
Pnxn +Hn,Bqi
Qnzn +HJ,Bqi
QJzJ + nBqi
(3)
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Fig. 1. System Model and security attacks.
where xn∈CNA,B×1 is the transmitted data vector by the
n-th Alice, NA,B ≤ min(NA, NB), QJ is the used AN
precoding matrix at Jimmy, zJ is Jimmy’s AN vector, and
nBqi ∈ CNB×1is the AWGN vector at Bob.
We assume a linear receive filter matrix F∗Bqi at Bob. The
AN-precoding matrix at Alice should satisfy the following
equation to cancel the AN at Bob
F∗BqiHn,B
q
i
Qn = 0NA,B−(NA−NA,B) (4)
LetWBqi be the covariance matrix of the interference vector
HJ,BqiQJzJ +nB
q
i
. Then, WBqi = HJ,BqiQJ(HJ,BqiQJ)
∗ +
κBqi INB . Bob uses the singular value decomposition (SVD)
of the equivalent channel matrix to design a receive filter
Ψ∗Bqi after applying a whitening filter W
−12
Bqi
. Following the
application of both filters, the received signal vector at Bob is
given by
Ψ∗BqiW
− 1
2
B
q
i
yBqi
= Ψ∗BqiW
− 1
2Hn,Bqi
Pnxn +Ψ
∗
B
q
i
n˜Bq
i
(5)
where n˜Bqi = W
− 12
Bqi
(Hn,BqiQnzn + HJ,B
q
i
QJzJ + nBqi )
and F∗
Bqi
= Ψ∗
Bqi
W
− 12
Bqi
denotes the overall receive fil-
ter at Bob. From (4), F∗BqiHn,BqiQn = 0, hence,
Ψ∗Bqi n˜B
q
i
= F∗BqiHJ,B
q
i
QJzJ + nBqi + F
∗
Bqi
Hn,BqiQn =
F∗BqiHJ,B
q
i
QJzJ + nBqi .
Let Un,BqiΣn,BqiV
∗
n,Bqi
be the SVD of the equivalent
channel matrix W−
1
2
Bqi
Hn,Bqi . The data precoder Pn and the
receive filter FBqi are the NA,B columns of Vn,Bqi andUn,Bqi ,
respectively, with the corresponding largest NA,B non-zero
singular values. The achievable rate at Bob is then given by
Rn,Bq
i
=log2 det
(
INB+pnH˜n,Bqi
Pn(H˜n,Bq
i
Pn)
∗C−1
J,B
q
i
)
(6)
where pn = θPANA,B , H˜n,Bqi = W
− 12
Bqi
Hn,Bqi and CJ,Bqi =
W
− 12
Bqi
( PJNJ−NEHJ,BqiQJ (HJ,BqiQJ )
∗+κBqi INB )W
− 12 ∗
Bqi
.
The received signal vector at Eve is given by
yE = Hn,EPnxn +Hn,EQnzn +HJ,EQJzJ + nE (7)
where nE ∈ CNE×1 is the AWGN vector at Eve.
To cancel the AN at Eve, the AN-precoding matrix at Jimmy
should satisfy
HJ,EQJ = 0NE×(NJ−NE) (8)
Note that the null space dimension is max{NJ −NE , 0}.
Finally, the achievable rate at Eve is given by
Rn,E = log2 det
(
INE + pnHn,EPA(Hn,EPA)
∗C−1n−E
) (9)
where Cn−E = (1−θ)PANA−NA,BHn,EQn(Hn,EQn)
∗ + κEINE .
B. Second Hop
The received signal vector at George is given by
yG = HBqi ,GPB
q
i
xBqi +HB
q
i ,G
QBqi zB
q
i
+HJ,GQJ z˜J+nG (10)
where xBqi ∈ CNB,G×1 is Bob’s transmitted data vector withNB,G ≤ min(NB, NG), QJ is the used AN precoding matrix
at Jimmy, z˜J is Jimmy’s AN vector during the second hop,
and nG ∈ CNG×1 is the AWGN vector at Eve.
Assume that a linear receive filter matrix F∗G ∈ CNB,G×NG
is used at George. Hence, to cancel Bob’s AN vector at
George’s receiver, the i-th Bob in subarea q sets
F∗GHBqi ,GQB
q
i
= 0NB,G×(NB−NB,G) (11)
Let WG be the covariance matrix of the interference vector
HJ,GQJ z˜J + nG. Then, WG = HJ,GQJ(HJ,GQJ)∗ +
κGING . Bob uses the SVD of the equivalent channel matrix
to design a linear receive filter Ψ∗G after applying a linear
whitening filter W−
1
2
G . Then, the filtered received signal vector
at Bob becomes equal to
Ψ∗GW
− 1
2
G yBqi
= Ψ∗GW
− 1
2
G Hn,Bqi
Pnxn +Ψ
∗
Gn˜G (12)
where n˜G = W
− 12
G (HBqi ,GQB
q
i
zBqi + HJ,GQJzJ + nG)
and F∗G = Ψ∗GW
− 12
G denotes the overall receive filter at
George. From (11), F∗GHBqi ,GQBqi = 0, then Ψ∗Gn˜G =
F∗G(HJ,GQJzJ+BG)+F
∗
GHBqi ,GQB
q
i
= F∗G(HJ,BqiQJzJ+
nG). The data precoder PBqi and the receive filter FG are also
derived based on the SVD of the equivalent channel matrix
W
− 12
G HBqi ,G.
The achievable rate at George is
RBqi ,G=log2 det
(
ING+pBqi H˜B
q
i ,G
PBqi (H˜B
q
i ,G
PBqi )
∗C−1J−G
)
(13)
where pBqi =
θPBq
i
NB,G and H˜Bqi ,G =W
− 12
G HBqi ,G and CJ−G =
W
− 12
G
(
PJ
NJ−NEHJ,GQJ(HJ,GQJ)
∗ + κGING
)
W
− 12 ∗
G .
The received signal vector at Eve is given by
yE = HBqi ,E
PBqi
xBqi
+HBqi ,E
QBqi
zBqi
+HJ,EQJzJ +nE (14)
where nE ∈ CNE×1 is the AWGN vector at Eve. Hence, the
achievable rate at Eve is
RBqi ,E
=log2 det
(
INE+pBqi
HBqi ,E
PBqi
(HBqi ,E
PBqi
)∗C−1B,E
)
(15)
whereCB,E =
(1−θ)P
B
q
i
NB−NB,GHBqi ,EQBqi (HJ,BqiQBqi )
∗+κEINE .
The instantaneous secrecy rate of the n-th Alice transmis-
sion to Bob during the ℓ-th communication time slot is
Rℓn−Bqi ,sec =
[
Rℓn−Bqi −R
ℓ
n−E
]+
(16)
The instantaneous secrecy rate of the Bqi -George link during
the ℓth communication time slot when the i-th Bob in subarea
q forwards the n-th Alice’s data packet is given by
RℓBqi−G,sec =
[
RℓBqi−G −R
ℓ
B
q
i−E
]+
(17)
Hence, the secrecy rate of the n-th Alice’s transmission is
Rn,sec = min
ℓ∈1,2,...,k
min{Rℓn−Bq
i
,sec, R
ℓ
B
q
i
−G,sec} (18)
Each Alice sends fixed-rate data packets in each hour. We
denote by R the target secrecy rate. Given that the data vector
is transmitted over k communication time slots, the minimum
of the k rates should be greater thanRk for successful decoding.
Otherwise, the system is said to be unsecured.
Assume that there exists m ≥ 1 Bobs, denoted by
Bq1 , · · · , Bqm in each subarea q. The outage probability of the
link between the n-th Alice and the m Bobs is
Pn−Bq = 1−
k∏
l=1
(
1−
m∏
i=1
Pr
{
Rℓn−Bqi <
R
k
})
(19)
where 1 − ∏mi=1 Pr{Rℓn−Bqi < Rk } is the probability that
the l-th message is at least successfully decoded at one Bob
in the subarea q. The outage probability of the q-th Bob’s
transmission when he forwards the n-th Alice’s data packet is
PBq−G = 1−
k∏
l=1
(
1−
m∏
i=1
Pr
{
RℓBqi−G <
R
k
})
(20)
Thus, the outage probability of the n-th Alice transmission is
Pnoutage = 1− (1− Pn−Bq )(1− PBq−G) (21)
Since Eve’s instantaneous CSI is assumed to be unknown at
the legitimate transmitting nodes, the gateway selection in a
subarea is realized based on the legitimate links’ CSI and rates.
Hence,
iˆ = argmax
i
{
min
{
Rn,Bqi , RBqi ,G
}} (22)
By using the encoding scheme over the available k commu-
nications subslots, the secrecy outage probability of the l-th
block (from the k blocks of a data packet) is
P ln,sec = P
block
n,sec = Pr
{
min
{
Rln−Bq
iˆ
,sec, R
l
B
q
iˆ
−G,sec
}
<
R
k
}
(23)
which is the probability that Eve can decode partially (or
completely) the n-th Alice transmitted information from either
the first hop or the second hop. Since the channels are i.i.d., the
probability in (23) is independent of time and block indices.
If k−m blocks of a data packet experience a secrecy outage,
which occurs with probability
(
P blockn,sec
)k−m
, Eve can decode
a fraction k−mk of the n-th Alice’s packet. Hence, the fraction
of unsecured data transmitted from the n-th Alice to George
is given by [9]
Pn,sec =
k∑
m=0
k −m
k
(
k
k −m
)
(P blockn,sec )
k−m(1− P blockn,sec )m
(24)
IV. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
We consider an SG wireless network with M = 200
consumers. Each channel coefficient is assumed to be a com-
plex circularly-symmetric Gaussian random variable with zero
mean and unit variance. We assume the following simulation
parameters: NA,B = min(NA, NB) = NB = 3 and NB,G =
min(NB, NG)=NG=2, NB=NG+1, NA=NB+1, NE=3
and NJ =4. We also assume that the energy consumption of
each consumer follows a normal distribution [1], [9] with mean
of 3 kWh and standard deviation of 1.5 kWh. The maximum
energy consumption of each consumer is set to 10 kWh.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the impact of the target secrecy rate R
on the system’s security. Increasing R degrades the security
due to the increased secrecy outage events. Moreover, Fig. 2
reveals that the fraction of unsecured data decreases as the
number of antennas at the legitimates nodes increases due to
spatial diversity gains while it increases when increasing the
active attacker antennas, denoted by NJ .
Fig. 3 quantifies the impacts of the target secrecy rate R and
our proposed redundant design, where m gateways (Bobs) are
available in each subarea, on the outage probability. Increasing
m significantly outperforms the case of a single Bob (i.e., m =
1). For example, for R = 10 bits/channel use, by increasing
m from 1 to 4, the outage probability is reduced by 75%.
The impacts of R and the number of gateways on the utility
monetary loss in dollars due to energy-demand estimation
errors are quantified in Fig. 4. In fact, increasing the number
of gateways in each subarea results in a much lower cost
since it mitigates channel fading by finding a gateway that
maximizes the end-to-end rate and, hence, the energy-demands
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Fig. 2. Impact of R on system’s security for different NA and NJ .
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Fig. 3. Impacts of R and the number of gateways on the system’s reliability.
of the consumers will be delivered reliably to the MDMS.
Moreover, increasing R increases the monetary loss until it
saturates around $9000 at high R as the outage probability
approaches 1 at high R.
Finally, Fig. 5 demonstrates that as the number of gateways
increases, the fraction of unsecured data decreases since the
rates of the legitimate links will increase while the eaves-
dropping links will remain statistically the same. That is,
in the gateway selection process, the relay that maximizes
the legitimate link rate will be selected, which results in a
non-decreasing rate for the legitimate system. This increases
both security and reliability of the legitimate transmissions.
Finally, increasing Alice’s number of antennas NA enhances
the system’ security by decreasing the fraction of unsecured
data since the legitimate link rate increases and more AN can
be injected.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We quantified the impact of the number of antennas at
various nodes, the transmission data rate, and the gateway
redundant design on the energy-demand estimation-error mon-
etary loss for the utility and the system’s reliability and
security. We showed that by increasing the number of gateways
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Fig. 4. Impacts of R and the number of gateways on the DSM error cost.
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Fig. 5. Impacts of NA and the number of gateways on the system’s security.
from 1 to 4, the utility’s monetary loss from $8, 357 to $1, 337
at target rate of 10 bits/channel use.
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